In this paper a test is made of whether the Danish electricity producer, Elsam partly or fully exploits its temporary dominant position in hours of congestion at the Nordic electricity market. There seems to be evidences suggesting that Elsam is successful in pursuing its objective of having a price in Western Denmark close to the maximum price of the surrounding and connected areas.
Introduction
The Nordic market for electricity was created during the nineties. A Norwegian market was created in 1993, Sweden joined in 1996 , Finland in 1998 and Denmark in 1999 -2000 The following information can be found: "The Nordic Elspot market concept has these key features:
• The Elspot concept is based on bids for purchase and sale of hourly contracts using three different bidding types: hourly bids, block bids and flexible hourly bids that cover all 24 hours of the next day.
• Within Norway -and at the interconnections between the Nordic countries -price mechanisms are used to relieve grid congestion (bottlenecks), by introducing different Elspot area prices. Within Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, grid congestion is managed by counter-trade purchases based on bids from generators.
• The Elspot market's System Price is the price of Elspot power where there is no grid congestion. The Elspot System Price prevails throughout the Nordic Power Exchange area when there is no grid congestion between bidding areas.
• The total geographic market is divided into bidding areas; these may 2 become separate price areas if the contractual flow of power between bid areas exceeds the capacity allocated for Elspot contracts by transmission system operators.
When such grid congestion develops, two or more area prices are created.
• Elspot prices are determined through auction trade for each delivery hour. The System Price (also called the Elspot System Price) and Area Prices are calculated after all participants' bids have been received.
Elspot Market Products
The Elspot market is a day-ahead physical-delivery power market and the deadline for submitting bids for the following day's delivery hours is 12 am (noon).
The products traded on the Elspot Market are bids of a one-hour duration, block bids and flexible hourly bids. Participants use an Internet application called Elweb for submitting bids to Elspot's trading system, or use EDIEL communication to submit their bid forms to the marketplace.
Contracts: Elspot market contracts are one-hour-long physical power (delivery to or take-off from the grid) obligations; minimum contract size is 0,1 MWh/h.
Hourly Bidding: An hourly bid is a sequence of price/volume pairs for each specified hour. Volumes are stated in MWh. In bidding, purchases are designated as positive numbers; sales as negative numbers.
Block Bid is an aggregated bid for several consecutive hours with a fixed bidding price and volume. The block bid price is compared with the average hourly price within the block period. A block bid must be accepted in its entirety; if 3 accepted the contract covers all hours and the volume specified in the bid.
Flexible Hourly Bid is a sales bid for a single hour with a fixed price and volume. The hour is not specified, but instead the bid will be accepted in the hour with the highest price, given that the price is higher than the limit set in the bid. For more information about bidding types download the following bidding brochure (pdf-format).
Elspot bidding form
Participants submit their bids (to make or take delivery) on bidding forms 1 covering all 24 delivery hours. At the Elspot marketplace, a purchase and sales curve and an equilibrium-point for each hour are established using the price/volume pairs in the participants bidding forms". See NordPoolSpot (2004).
One might be tempted to conclude that the whole Nordic area must be considered one market due to these arrangements, but such a conclusion is not valid. In fact, due to the limitations of the capacity to transport electricity between geographical areas, the Elspot geographical market is divided into bidding areas which may become separate price areas "if the contractual flow of power between bid areas exceeds the capacity allocated for Elspot contracts by transmission system operators". partly or fully exploits its temporary dominant position, as indicated by the company's publicly declared goal "to be as close to the highest price of the surrounding areas as possible" and the second question is whether the company is able to create "congestion" themselves. The third question is under which conditions their declared goal is optimal.
In this paper we try to answer mainly the first question, and whether
Elsam successfully fulfills its declared objective to a reasonable degree. However, the second question will be touched upon in the discussion.
Several other studies have been made on the Nordic Elspot market. In the study by Haldrup and Nielsen (2004) it is found that a regime switching model long memory model is appropriate in forecasting electricity prices.
Hence, the results indicate that the model for the bottleneck periods is different from the model for the periods where no congestion exists. Johnsen, Verma, and Wolfram (1999) find that there exists some empirical evidence for higher prices in periods with congestion in Norway, while Hjalmarsson (2000) finds no evidence of the use of market power using weekly data. Steen (2003) like Hjalmarsson models the demand side by a Bresnahan-Lau model, uses hourly data, and finds that the producers in South Norway take advantage of the market power in bottleneck periods, but the economic significance is found to be low, as the bottleneck periods between South and North Norway are limited in numbers.
In this study we include the German side as well. Although Germany is not included in the Nordic Elspot market, it is obvious that the German electricity production must have some influence on the Nordic market. Part of the electricity trade between the Nordic countries and Germany is based on 6 longer term contracts as is the electricity trade between Finland and Russia.
In addition, the transmission capacity between Denmark and Germany is allocated by use of yearly, monthly and daily auctions, which use the "useit-or loose it" principle, which is less efficient than the so-called "market coupling" system, which is going to be introduced in the near future. The use of long term contracts and the "use-it-or loose it" principle implies that the electricity in a given hour may go from high price areas to low price areas. Another possible explanation for this phenomenon may of course also be coursed by an attempt to congest a link in order to exploit the stronger position. Whether such a strategy is profitable depends upon whether the loss in creating the congestion by sending electricity to a lower priced area is smaller than the profit obtained in your home market, which is either its own bidding area or maybe connected to areas with even higher prices.
In this paper a test is made of whether Elsam partly or fully exploits its temporary dominant position in hours of congestion, and fulfills the company's publicly declared goal " to be as close to the highest price of the surrounding areas as possible". The null hypothesis is that they are not and such a hypothesis is very clear rejected. Hence, although rejection of the null does not imply that the alternative is true there seems to be evidences suggesting that Elsam is successful in pursuing its objective of having a price in Western Denmark close to the maximum price of the surrounding and 2 The market position of Elsam.
Elsam is by far the most important producer of electricity in Western Denmark, see Konkurrencestyrelsen (2004) and Nordic-Competition-Authorities The networks were operated by ELTRA, an independent company, which was owned by consumers and municipalities, but with some cross ownership to Elsam. However, the network can be seen as independent of the producers.
The tariffs of the transmission system were regulated and consisted of an entry charge and an exit charge. The import/export transmission capacity from/to Western Denmark to/from Norway were 1000MW, to/from Sweden 670 MW, and to/from Germany 800MW or a total of 2470 MW.
3 The price data.
The data applied in the current study are hourly price series for (South)
Norway, P no t , Sweden, P sv t , (North) Germany, P ty t , and Western Den- The price data indicate that hourly electricity prices and thereby the hourly market for electricity in Western Denmark are different from the markets in the surrounding and connected area in a considerable number of hours, and that while the Norwegian and Swedish markets seem to be quite correlated, the German market is behaving quite differently from them.
Descriptive statistics for the series are shown in The simple correlations between the price series are shown in Table 2 .
The correlations between the German prices and the highly correlated Norwegian and Swedish prices are quite low also when the prices are smoothed.
The Danish hourly prices have a correlation with the Norwegian and Swedish hourly prices of 0.5-0.6, a correlation which is increased to 0.7 and 0.9 by smoothing by daily and weekly moving averages, while the correlation between the Danish and the German price is around 0.4 in all three cases. This is also shown in Tables 3 to 5 , where it is seen that the prices in Western Denmark are different from the North German prices in practically all hours, in fact P dkv t is more than 5% higher than P ty t in 55% of the hours and more than 5% lower in 31.4% of the hours 5 . Hence, there seems to be no evidence in favor of neither the hypothesis that the whole connected area can be considered one market operating all hours, nor the hypothesis that the Nordic part i.e. Sweden, South Norway and Western Denmark forms one market operating in most hours. A result which supports the findings of Haldrup and Nielsen (2004) .
Correlations: Hourly prices
A comparison of the Swedish and South Norwegian prices is made in Table 6 and in 71% of the hours the two areas have the same price, while the prices are more than 5% apart in only 17% of the hours. In addition, the distribution of P sv t around P no t is symmetric. This indicates that these two areas are much closer connected than the other areas. 
The strategy of Elsam
The question to be answered now is whether Elsam's strategy of having the price in Western Denmark being as close to the maximum price of the surrounding area as possible has been successful. In answering this question we will make the following assumption:
Assumption: If Pdkv equals the price in a surrounding area, no congestion exists on the connection between West Denmark and that area.
Obviously it may be discussed whether a small deviation from a price in a surrounding area implies congestion or no congestion, but the results will not differ significantly if less than a 1% deviation was taken to mean no congestion, as is seen from the tables above.
In Table 7 it is shown that P dkv t is equal to the maximum of the prices in the surrounding areas in 8138 hours out of the total 26280 hours corresponding to 31%, and that the maximum price is more than 5% higher than the Danish price in 48.3% of the hours Table 7 . P dkv t and max[P no t , P sv t , P ty t ]
The figures in Table 7 include the hours when the price between Western
Denmark and the price in one of the other areas are the same, and where therefor the lines between the two areas are not congested by assumption.
This problem is solved in Table 8 where the rows indicate the number of hours where the absolute difference between the Norwegian, the Swedish or the German price to the Danish price is at its minimum but still positive difference. Hence, in 4329 hours the absolute price difference | P no t − P dkv t |> 0 was the smallest among the three price differences | P no t − P dkv t |> 0, | P sv t − P dkv t |> 0 and | P ty t − P dkv t |> 0. The columns indicate the number of hours P no t , P sv t ,or P ty t is the maximum price among the three prices. In order not to double count hours where the position as the maximum price is shared between two or three areas, the column indicating the number of hours where for instance P ty t is the maximum price, only counts the hours where P ty t 6 = P no t or P ty t 6 = P sv t . 
Number of hours
where x ij , i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1, 2, 3 is the (i, j) element, x i·. and x .·j are the row and column sums respectively, while x ·· is the total sum. Under the null of independence Q is distributed as χ Hence, the null hypothesis of independence is rejected at every conceivable choice of significance level. Another and possibly more appropriate test is the binomial test, where the null hypothesis is that Elsam is not able to get close to maximum price of the surrounding areas in more hours than would be expected by chance. Hence, under the null, the expected number of hours in the diagonal of Table 8 should be one third of the total number of hours.
The test is based on the statistics 
which gives a p-value of 1 − NormalDist (14.69; 0, 1) = 0.0. Hence, although rejection of the null does not imply that the alternative is true there seems to be evidences suggesting that Elsam is successful in pursuing its objective of having a price in Western Denmark close to the maximum price of the surrounding and connected areas.
Notice, that the tests presented above are biased in favour of the null as the hours where P dkv t is equal to the maximum price are not counted as "success" hours for Elsam, but as hours where there is no congestion on the lines. However, as the null is clearly rejected the bias poses no problem for the results reported.
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Conclusion
In this paper a test is made of whether Elsam partly or fully exploits its temporary dominant position in hours of congestion, and fulfill the company's publicly declared goal " to be as close to the highest price of the surrounding areas as possible". The null hypothesis is that they are not and such a hypothesis is very clear rejected. Hence, although rejection of the null does not imply that the alternative is true there seems to be evidences suggesting that Elsam is successful in pursuing its objective of having a price in Western Denmark close to the maximum price of the surrounding and connected areas.
The questions not answered in this paper are whether Elsam is able to create "congestion" and whether the actually do create congestion, and under which conditions their declared goal is optimal compared to a full exploitation of their temporary monopoly. 
